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Abstract—We propose a model to study short-term interbank
lending from a network formation perspective. Banks, being
provided with public and private signals about the solvency of
other banks, decide on interbank lending by also considering the
decision of other banks to lend. We observe that the dominant
equilibrium networks are those where banks follow each others’
decisions, making the equilibria very vulnerable to shifts in
expectations. The networks range from fully connected (highly
liquid markets) to empty networks (frozen markets) and we
derive the conditions under which they emerge.
I. INTRODUCTION
As evidenced, for example, during the 2007 global financial
turmoil, a characteristic of a financial crisis is contagion where
a relatively small event, like the failure of a single financial
institution, may trigger a chain reaction. This failure can
spread to the whole financial system and eventually reach
out to the real economy. In order to capture the connections
between financial institutions a network approach has been
chosen that focuses on interbank lending.
Financial systems can be seen as networks, with nodes
representing individual financial institutions, and links repre-
senting their bilateral exposures, such as interbank loans, credit
lines or derivatives positions. Starting from the parsimonious
financial network of [1] which consists of only four banks,
scholars have investigated various financial networks for a
wide range of markets that are increasingly detailed and
realistic, see [2] for a review of interbank network properties.
The network structure is found to be greatly influential for
the systemic risk of a banking system, see e.g. [3], [4], [5].
Although some universal features of financial networks have
been discovered and studied, many questions await further
exploration, such as how these features arise from interactions
between individual financial institutions, how they further
influence other banks’ behaviors, and how these interactions
may help to escalate or mitigate systemic risk.
One of the motives behind this work is to offer some
insights into the phenomenon of liquidity freezes in interbank
markets as was clearly observed and highly noted in the 2007
financial crisis. Money markets that were used to be highly
liquid suddenly saw a ”freeze” in liquidity, with extremely
high borrowing rates. Two possible explanations are offered
as to why market players with excess liquidity are not willing
to lend to the market in [6]: fear of counter-party risks and
liquidity hoarding (fear of a future liquidity shortage). These
two fears may intertwine together to cause a ”freeze” in
interbank lending. Among the literature referring to financial
network formations, few have focused on explaining liquidity
freezes, yet it should be interesting to explore this issue from
the network formation perspective and how such freezes might
emerge.
In this paper, based on the idea in [7] and developed
further, we propose a model for the formation of short-term
interbank loan networks, under the assumption that banks
can observe each others’ lending decisions and adjust their
evaluations of borrowers accordingly. Under this assumption,
a bank’s lending decision generates information to other banks
and they may sometimes exhibit herding in making lending
decisions. Our primary interest is to find equilibrium structures
of interbank networks ranging from a complete network (fully
liquid market) to an empty network (market freeze), and show
how their occurrence depends on individual behaviour. We find
that how likely each structure is to occur depends on banks’
risk aversion, the expected returns on interbank loans, and
uncertainty of private information. For a stressed market, fea-
turing low expectations of debt paying ability, banks eventually
cause a frozen market. For a stressed market featuring high
risk aversion, banks may have multiple equilibrium structures
including a freeze, because banks may either refuse lending
or follow each other’s decisions.
The main part of this article is organized as follows: in
section 2, we review the related literature and section 3 devel-
ops the model of how individual banks form and update their
beliefs while section 4 assesses their decisions about interbank
lending and describes the algorithm used to determine the
equilibrium network structures. We analyse the probability
distribution of equilibrium networks in section 5 and section
6 discusses some policy implications before we conclude our
article in section 7.
II. DETERMINANTS OF INTERBANK LENDING
Firstly, this work is related to a strand of literature investi-
gating systemic risk in interbank markets. The mechanisms of
contagion can be generally classified into two types: contagion
through direct links, which refers to a situation where one
insolvent bank may cause losses to its creditor bank and
consequently triggers insolvency among its creditors; and
secondly contagion through indirect links, which includes
liquidity hoarding, common assets exposure under fire sales,
and bank runs.
Studies of contagion through direct links are perhaps most
abundant. Some important early models all follow the stan-
dard model of [8] but extend it with a network perspective.
However, these models consider only very simple network
structures, usually only three structures are studied, a complete
network, a ring network and an empty network. [1] and [9]
are two such early standard models, which have much similar
settings. Banks have incentives to hold bilateral exposures,
changing deposits [1] or having credit lines [9], due to
uncertainty about deposit withdrawals, uncertainty of when
depositors they consume [1] or where they consume [9]. Then
under the three different network structures, they examine how
the shocks spread out through a liquidity preference shock [1]
or risky long-term assets [9]. Similar conclusions are drawn
from both models, a complete network is usually more stable
than an incomplete network (a ring network) since there are
more banks to share the loss of a given shock. Following this
strand of literature, [10], [11], and [12] investigate network
formations in which banks choose to form a network that
maximize their utility through risk diversification, profit max-
imization or reducing the risk of contagion. Another strand
of literature develops models of financial contagion based on
more complex networks, mainly random graphs, and most of
these studies have noted that some sort of ”phase transition” of
systemic risk happens in such networks, which is also referred
to by [13] as financial networks having ”robust-yet-fragile”
feature. In models like [4] and [14], this feature means that
there exist tipping points for the level of connectivity, and
that sharp changes in levels of systemic risk (the extent of
contagion) occur around these tipping points. [5] find that
tipping points also exist for the size of initial shock. [15]
find a necessary condition for contagion to not encompass
the entire network and develop a resilience measure which
is a function of each bank’s connectivity and fraction of
contagious links. All tipping points for macroeconomic shocks
correspond to positive resilience measure values. [16] develop
the work of [4] by adding heterogeneity into the model and
show that heterogenous connectivity, the size of banks and
degree correlations play a role in determining the stability of
a financial system.
Studies of contagion through indirect linkage include liq-
uidity hoarding, common asset exposures under fire sales, and
bank runs. [17] present a model showing that banks can be
illiquid but solvent. They find that in equilibrium it is possible
that solvent banks still fail to obtain liquidity from interbank
markets due to the liquidity hoarding of informed investors.
For this reason, they argue the importance of a lender of
last resort. [18] present a model that highlight the role of
asymmetric information in the assessment of counterparty risk
leading to liquidity hoarding among liquid potential providers
of funds. The result is that the market fails to reach the
desirable equilibrium but instead reaches a liquidity freeze.
[19] present a model showing precautionary liquidity hoarding
arising from lenders fearing rollover risk that can help to
explain market stress, where high rates and low volumes for
borrowing are the result of high leverage and the illiquidity of
assets. [6] present a similar model of banks’ choices between
liquid and illiquid assets in a portfolio where banks have
incentives to hoard liquidity not only due to rollover risk but
also have the opportunity to buy fire sale assets of other banks
that face liquidity shortages. Finally, [20] present a model
that considers the interplay of market liquidity and funding
liquidity and shows that they can be mutually reinforcing as
liquidity spirals when margins are destabilising.
Secondly, this work is also related to another growing
strand of literature on network formation games as applied
to financial systems. One strand sees the network formation
as a static game, like [11], [10], [5], where all individuals
make decisions simultaneously. They are all based on the
standard model of [1] but extend it to N banks and assume
banks consider the risk of potential shocks to them or to
their neighbors when choosing links. In [11], this is done by
a social planner solving for and then proposing an optimal
network based on the banks’ random initial endowments with
banks choosing to accept the proposal or have an empty
network. In making decisions, banks try to balance the tradeoff
between risk sharing and the risk of contagion. This is because
being linked in a network on the one hand offers resources
to lend from when one is facing an unexpected liquidity
shock, yet on the other hand, one may suffer from losses
when others withdraw money. In the model of [10] banks are
classified into two types, and banks play a network formation
game within each type. The primary concern of a bank is to
prevent the risk of contagion, thus a bank chooses the network
where no single neighbor’s liquidation should lead to its own
bankruptcy. In the model of [5] banks propose debt contracts
conditional on borrowers’ lending behaviour. As a result [11]
find the network can be ex ante optimal, but a collapse of
the whole system may still occur in some cases. [10] show
the network can be resilient with a large number of banks,
which means the probability of contagion can be close to zero.
[5] find that the equilibrium interbank network formed can
be vulnerable to contagion, due to the presence of financial
network externalities which cause the emergence of socially
inefficient network.
Another strand of this literature see the network formation
as a process of evolution, e.g. [21] and [22]. In the model
of [21] banks form a network from random rewiring. The
possibility a bank links to another bank depends on the
latter’s profitability, a bank’s in-degree is thus a signal for
its profitability. How much banks value this signal influences
the structure of the network eventually formed. In the model
of [22] rollover decisions are made as in a foreclosure game.
Whether a bank chooses to rollover depends on its cost of mis-
coordination and the borrower’s asset-to-liability ratio, which
are random and time-dependent. Consequently, the network
structure evolves overtime, and the average connectivity in the
stationary state depends on debt maturity and miscoordination
cost. There is also model like [23] that use a combination of
static and dynamic games.
Among the work studying interbank network formation,
we especially refer to [7] where rollover decisions of banks
depend on the existing architecture of interbank networks. We
keep the salient feature of their model, which is a bank’s
lending decision provides information to other banks, but have
notable differences in both the details of the approach taken
and aim of the model.
III. A MODEL OF INTERBANK LENDING DECISIONS
We assess a banking system in which N banks are con-
sidering lending to each other. For simplicity we assume that
all loans are of the same size and mature in a single time
period such that we can focus on the rollover decisions by
banks. Furthermore, there are no constraints on the ability of
banks to lend to each other and banks are always willing to
accept any loans they are given. This simplification allows us
to concentrate on the lending decision itself rather than having
to consider the impact of any such constraints on the outcomes.
Banks only differ in their risk of repaying this loan and the
signals banks receive about this risk.
Interbank lending can be represented by a directed network
where each node represents a bank and the edges the existence
of a loan between two banks. This network can be represented
by an adjacency matrix A = {aij}i,j=1,...,N , where aij = 1
if bank i lends to bank j and zero otherwise. Obviously we
require that ∀i = 1, . . . , N : aii = 0.
Decisions on interbank lending are assumed to be done
decentrally such that each loan is assessed individually by
a risk averse decision-maker maximizing expected utility.
Approximating the expected utility of bank i giving a loan
to bank j in the usual way with absolute risk aversion λi ≥ 0,
we get
Uij = aijµij − 1
2
λiaijσ
2
ij , (1)
where µij and σ2ij denote the expected value and variance of
the return bank i believes to be generated from lending to bank
j. This return will not only include the interest charged, but
most importantly also include the possible default of bank j
and the subsequent losses arising from this.
The following section will now explore how these expected
values and variances are determined. We will use information
based on public and private signals in a first step to assess
each loan and then in addition also use information based on
the lending decisions of other banks.
A. Assessment of private signals on interbank lending returns
Banks know that the true return of bank i, ri, is a random
variable that is normally distributed with mean µi and common
variance σ2:
ri ∼ N
(
µi, σ
2
)
. (2)
This true return, however, cannot be directly observed. Instead
each bank receives a private noisy signal that is independent
of the true return as well as independent across banks:
r̂ij = rj + εij , (3)
εij ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
.
Banks can now use their noisy signal r̂ij to infer the true
return of the bank using conditional expectations:
µj|i = E [rj |r̂ij ] = µj + σ
2
σ2r
(r̂ij − µj) , (4)
σ2j|i = V ar [rj |r̂ij ] =
(
σ2r − σ2
)
σ2
σ2r
,
where σ2r = V ar [r̂ij ] = σ
2 + σ2ε . Hence the return bank
i receives from lending to bank j, rj|i, is believed to be a
random variable distributed as follows:
rj|i ∼ N
(
µj|i, σ2j|i
)
. (5)
Similarly we know that private signals for bank j will also
affect our assessment of bank k’s signal about bank j due to
the correlation between the two signals:
µkj|ij = E [r̂kj |r̂ij ] = µk + σ
2
σ2r
(r̂ij − µk) , (6)
σ2kj|ij = V ar [r̂kj |r̂ij ] =
σ4r − σ4
σ2r
,
and hence
rkj|ij ∼ N
(
µkj|ij , σ2kj|ij
)
. (7)
Finally we can easily verify following [24] that the correlation
between these updated signals is given by
ρj|i,kj|ij =
σ2√
σ2 + σ2r
, (8)
This correlation can now be used to determine the joint
distribution of rkj|ij and rj|i.
B. Updating beliefs from lending decisions
In addition to the private signal, banks can also extract
information from the behavior of other banks, i. e. whether
they lend or not to a specific bank. This decision will reveal
partially the private signal the other bank has received and
can be taken into account when assessing one’s own lending
decision. A bank will only lend if Uij ≥ 0 as for non-lending
we have that due to aij = 0 it is Uij = 0.
Once the information from the private signal has been
assessed as in the previous section, banks will assess the
information available from other banks’ lending decisions
separately. The following lemma provides the the results of
these considerations:
Lemma 3.1: Observing the decision of another bank k to
lend to bank j, the assessment of the expected return of bank
j and its variance by bank i are given by
µ̂ij|k = E
[
rj|i|Ukj > 0
]
(9)
= µj|i + ρj|i,kj|ijσj|i
φ
(
γ−µkj|ij
σkj|ij
)
1− Φ
(
γ−µkj|ij
σkj|ij
) ,
σ̂ij|k = V ar
[
rj|i|Ukj > 0
]
= σ2j|i
1− ρj|i,kj|i φ
(
γ−µkj|ij
σkj|ij
)
1− Φ
(
γ−µkj|ij
σkj|ij
) ×
 φ
(
γ−µkj|ij
σkj|ij
)
1− Φ
(
γ−µkj|ij
σkj|ij
) − γ − µkj|ij
σkj|ij
 ,
where γ =
(
σ2r−σ2
σ2
) (
1
2λiσ
2 − µi
)
. Similarly we can get
those moments for the case that bank k does not lend to bank
j:
µ̂ij|−k = E
[
rj|i|Ukj < 0
]
(10)
= µj|i − ρj|i,kj|ijσj|i
φ
(
γ−µkj|ij
σkj|ij
)
Φ
(
γ−µkj|ij
σkj|ij
) ,
σ̂ij|−k = V ar
[
rj|i|Ukj < 0
]
= σ2j|i
1− ρj|i,kj|i φ
(
γ−µkj|ij
σkj|ij
)
Φ
(
γ−µkj|ij
σkj|ij
) ×
 φ
(
γ−µkj|ij
σkj|ij
)
Φ
(
γ−µkj|ij
σkj|ij
) − γ − µkj|ij
σkj|ij
 ,
Proof The proof is a straightforward application of the mo-
ments of truncated normal distributions, where we note from
(1) that Ukj > 0 is equivalent to r̂kj > γ if we replace µij
with µj|i and σij with σj|i.
Based on this lemma we can thus determine the expected
returns and variance of bank j as assessed by bank i:
µij =
{
µ̂ij|k if ajk = 1
µ̂ij|−k if ajk = 0
, (11)
σij =
{
σ̂ij|k if ajk = 1
σ̂ij|−k if ajk = 0
.
These expressions can now be inserted into equation (1) to
assess the utility of bank i from lending to bank j. As this
utility will depend on the behavor of another bank, k, we will
rewrite this utility as Uij(ajk). The coming section will now
discuss how the equilibrium in this model can be determined
for the special case of N = 3.
IV. DETERMINATION OF EQUILIBRIA IN A THREE-BANK
SYSTEM
In the coming sections we will restrict our analysis to a
banking system with three banks. While such a restriction
Conditions Probability Strategy
1 Uij(0) < 0, Uij(1) < 0 Φ(
r̂ij|k−µ
σ2+σ2ε
) not lending
2 Uij(0) > 0, Uij(1) > 0 1− Φ( r̂ij|−k−µσ2+σ2ε ) lending
3 Uij(0) < 0, Uij(1) > 0 Φ(
r̂ij|−k−µ
σ2+σ2ε
)− Φ( r̂ij|k−µ
σ2+σ2ε
) following
4 Uij(0) > 0 and Uij(1) < 0 0 anti-following
TABLE I
STRATEGIES FOR BANK i LENDING TO BANK j
seems unrealistic for most actual banking systems, it allows
us to provide a complete characterisation of the possible
equilibrium lending structures and gain some generalizable
insights into interbank markets. The number of possible net-
work structures is 2N(N−1) and thus for N = 3 consists of 64
potential equilibria to consider while for N = 4 this becomes
an untractable 4096 potential equilibria.
A. Individual lending strategies
As we can see from equation (11), the expected returns
and risks of bank i lending to bank j depend on the behavior
of the remaining bank, k. Banks will lend if the expected
utility from doing so exceeds the expected utility from not
lending, with the former given by equation (1) and the latter
easily being verified to be zero by inserting aij = 0. We
can now investigate the different potential outcomes in the
lending decision of bank i towards bank j. If Uij(0) < 0
and Uij(1) < 0, then the bank will not lend as regardless of
the behavior of the other bank as the expected utility from
doing so is negative. Similarly, if Uij(0) > 0 and Uij(1) > 0,
then the bank will lend as regardless of the behavior of the
other bank as the expected utility from doing so is positive.
If Uij(0) < 0 and Uij(1) > 0, then the bank will only lend
if the other bank also lends as only with the information that
the other bank lends, the expected utility becomes positive.
We will refer to this situation as ”bank i following bank k”.
Finally, if Uij(0) > 0 and Uij(1) < 0, then the bank will
only lend if the other bank does not do so as the expected
utility from doing so is negative. We will refer to this situation
as ”bank i anti-following bank k”. Table I summarizes these
situations. We can now determine the probabilities for each of
these situations by firstly defining
r̂ij|k ∈ {r̂ij |Uij(1) = 0} , (12)
r̂ij|−k ∈ {r̂ij |Uij(0) = 0} .
We can solve for r̂ij|k and r̂ij|−k numerically. As we can show
that Uij(0) is monotonic in r̂ij , the solution for r̂ij|−k will be
unique. While Uij(1) is not monotonic in r̂ij in general, it is
so in the range of realistic parameters, such that the solution
will be unique in the relevant range. We furthermore can easily
show that r̂ij|k ≥ r̂ij|−k.
Given the definition of r̂ij|k and r̂ij|−k in equation (12)
it is obvious that Uij(0) < 0 is equivalent to r̂ij < r̂ij|−k
and Uij(1) < 0 corresponds to r̂ij < r̂ij|k. The prob-
abilities for each of the four lending strategies can now
easily be determined where the ”not lending” corresponds to
Strategy (i, j) Observed outcome (i, j)
(not lending, not lending) (not lending, not lending)
(following, not lending) (not lending, not lending)
(lending, not lending) (lending, not lending)
(not lending, following) (not lending, not lending)
(following, following) (lending, lending), (not lending, not lending)
(lending, following) (lending, lending)
(not lending, lending) (not lending, lending)
(following, lending) (lending, lending)
(lending, lending) (lending, lending)
TABLE II
STRATEGY COMBINATIONS FOR BANKS i AND kLENDING TO BANK j
Prob(r̂ij < r̂ij|−k ≤ r̂ij|k) and ”lending” has a probability
of Prob(r̂ij > r̂ij|k ≥ r̂ij|−k). The strategy ”following” has
a probability of Prob(r̂ij|−k < r̂ij ≤ r̂ij|k) and the strategy
”anti-following” corresponds to Prob(r̂ij|−k > r̂ij ≥ r̂ij|k),
which is impossible as r̂ij|k ≥ r̂ij|−k and hence we can neglect
this strategy. The probabilities are shown in table I and the
derivation is straightforward when using the distribution of
the returns from equations (2) and (3).
In order to obtain the equilibrium lending structures we will
also need to consider the distribution of lending decisions to
bank j by banks i and k. We can easily derive that[
r̂ij
r̂kj
]
∼ N
([
µj
µj
]
,
[
σ2 + σ2ε σ
2
σ2 σ2 + σ2ε
])
. (13)
Table II shows the possible strategy combinations and the
outcome of the lending decision which we would observe.
The corresponding probabilities could easily be derived from
the joint distribution in equation (13). With these results we
can now continue to apply an algorithm to find all possible
equilibria in the coming section.
B. Algorithm to determine equilibria
Each bank has three possible strategies, ”lending”, ”not
lending”, and ”following”. In a network consisting of three
banks there are six possible lending decisions, hence a total
of 36 = 729 scenarios have to be considered. For each scenario
we can now determine the probability of its occurrence. Using
the possible strategy combinations from table II we can deter-
mine the probability for each pair of banks by applying the
joint distribution from equation (13). As ri is by assumption
independently distributed across banks, the probability of a
scenario is given by the product of the probabilities for each
of the three pairs.
In a scenario those strategies that are ”lending” or ”not
lending” are taken as examined because they do not depend
on the action of other banks. Strategies that are ”following”
are classified as unexamined.
For each scenario we now need to determine the equilibrium
outcome by applying the following steps:
1) All examined strategies are fixed at that value and if
there are no unexamined strategies we have established
a unique equilibrium for that scenario. If there are
unexamined strategies, we continue with the next step.
2) If there is an examined strategy from bank k to bank
j and an unexamined relationship from bank i to bank
j, then this unexamined relationship is set to the same
value as the examined relationship and marked itself as
examined and we have established a unique equilibrium
for this scenario. If there are any more unexamined
strategies, we continue with the final step.
3) If banks i and k both follow a strategy of ”following”
for lending to bank j, then multiple equilibria will
occur, namely both ”following” or both ”not following”.
Depending on how many pairs of banks have unexam-
ined strategies, the type and number of equilibria are
different and shown in table III. We assume that each
of the possible equilibria has an equal probability of
occurrence.
Having now determined the equilibria for each scenario and
calculated their probabilities, we now have to aggregate those
probabilities for networks that are observationally identical.
We thus have established a probability distribution for the
equilibria and we can instantly see that each of the 64 possible
networks can be an equilibrium network, the probability of its
occurrence will vary though with the parameters employed,
namely the expected returns µi, variance σ2, signal precision
σε and the risk aversion of the banks λi.
The following section will now evaluate the properties of the
resulting equilibria, firstly for a homogenous banking system
and then for a banking system with banks of different expected
returns.
V. EQUILIBRIUM STRUCTURES
Using the procedure outlined above we can now continue to
assess the interbank lending that would emerge in equilibrium.
We will assess how key variables affect the equilibrium
interbank lending behavior of banks firstly in the case of all
banks having the same expected returns and differing only in
the private signals they receive about the expected returns for
lending to other banks. We will then extend this restrictive case
to incorporate banks with different returns as a more realistic
alternative.
A. Homogeneous banks
Let us firstly assume that the expected return of providing
interbank loans to banks is identical for all banks, i. e. ∀i :
µi = µ. As the private signal banks receive cannot be observed
by other banks or an outside spectator, all banks are ex-ante
identical and the number of potential networks reduces from
64 to 16 as we can ignore the identity of banks and aggregate
networks that are therefore looking alike, i. e. topologically
equivalent.
With the aforementioned, each of these 16 interbank lending
networks will be an equilibrium for any parameter constel-
lation, the probability of observing a specific network will,
however, vary. It are these probabilities of observing a specific
network structure that we focus our subsequent analysis on.
We set σ = 1 as a normalization of the amount of risk in
the banking system, having verified that the results presented
Unexamined strategies Equilibrium networks
1 unexamined strategy (i and k
towards j)
k kki kj  	@R
k kki kj
2 unexamined strategies (i and k
for j, i and j for k)
k kki kj  	@R
k kki kj
k kki kj
-
  	@R
k kki kj
-
 
3 unexamined strategies (i and k
for j, i and j for k, j and k for
i)
k kki kj  	@R
k kki kj
k kki kj
-
  	@R
k kki kj
-
 
k kki kjﬀ  	@I@Rk kki kjﬀ@I
k kki kj
-ﬀ
  	@I@R
k kki kj
-ﬀ
 @I
TABLE III
MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA WITH UNEXAMINED STRATEGIES
here are not substantially affected by this normalization. The
parameters we are varying in the following analysis are the
risk aversion of banks, λi, which for simplicity we assume
to be identical across banks, i. e. ∀i : λi = λ, the expected
returns µ, and the precision of the private signal σε.
Holding λ and σε constant, we firstly analyse the impact the
expected return µ has on the main equilibrium networks that
emerge. Figure 1 shows the probabilities of all 16 networks for
a range of expected returns. it is obvious from the figure that
the networks that can actually be observed will be dominated
by only four of the 16 possible networks, which are shown
separately in figure 2. Firstly we observe that for low expected
returns the empty network dominates all other equilibrium
networks. The low expected returns make the provision of
interbank loans unprofitable unless a very large positive private
signal is received. Such a large private signal is very unlikely
to be received and thus anything but a non lending decision
has a small probability. Once the expected return increases,
the private signal compensating a large negative expected
return becomes more likely. Furthermore the likelihood of a
following strategy increases as the private signal itself might
not be sufficient to induce lending, but in combination with
the lending decision of the other bank this might be sufficient.
Hence we will slowly observe the emergence of lending to at
least one bank. As the expected return increases even more,
it becomes more and more likely that the same will become
true for the private signals regarding two banks and we observe
the emergence of a third equilibrium in which two banks are
lent money. A further increase of the expected return will
then make the lending to all three banks more and more
likely, first arising from following strategies and then once
the expected return is sufficiently positive also based directly
on the expected return. We note that the full network emerges
only once the expected return is significantly above zero due
to the risk aversion of the banks. Once the expected returns
are sufficiently positive the entire reasoning reverses.
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Fig. 1. Probability of equilibrium network structures for varying parameters
(base case µ = 2, λ = 2.5, σr = 1.6)
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Fig. 2. Dominant equilibrium networks
From this reasoning of the observed dominant equilibrium
networks we see that they are those networks that allow a
following strategy as shown in table III. The origin of this
result arises from the fact that a following strategy is the most
likely observation for expected returns that are neither too
large or too small.
For positive expected returns, the likelihood of observing a
full network reduces as the risk aversion λ increases as we can
see from figure 1. The reasoning is obvious: as the risks are
becoming more and more important, it does allow the private
signal to be less and less negative in order to generate positive
expected utility. For the same reason the empty network
becomes more and more likely. Once again we observe an
intermediate range with other network structures that allow for
following strategies with the same arguments as above. The
main difference, however, is that as the risk aversion increases,
the empty network does not become dominant but rather the
four main network stabilise in fixed proportions. The origin
of this observation is that while a higher risk aversion reduces
the expected utility of lending, the very same consideration
will also be true of the other banks, hence observing another
bank lending implies a very high private signal, making the
adjustment to the expected return and variance in lemma
3.1 more pronounced, offsetting each other in the variance
and expected return and thereby causing the stability of the
probabilities of equilibrium network structures as the risk
aversion increases.
Looking at the impact of the total risk, σr, on the probability
of observing specific equilibrium networks, we observe a
similar pattern as in the case of increasing risk aversion. The
reason here is firstly along the same lines as with risk aversion,
but in addition we can also see that the update of expected
returns and variance reduces as the variance of the private
signal increases due to its much more limited informational
content. Hence banks rely less on their private information
and observing other banks will also have limited informational
value.
In summary, we find that the equilibrium network structures
are dominated by four networks that are all consistent with
banks adopting a following strategy.
B. Banks with different returns
We now relax the assumption that the expected returns
of all banks are identical and instead focus on a situation
where 0 = µ1 ≤ µ2 ≤ µ3 = 2, with other parameter
constellations showing comparable results. As the middle-
ranking bank increases its expected returns, µ2, we see from
figure 3 that the empty network becomes less likely and
the full network more likely. An increase in µ2 will, ceteris
paribus, make the lending to the middle ranking bank more
attractive and thus the absence of any lending will become less
likely. Similarly the likelihood of a full network will increase.
The other two dominant networks, which are identical to the
ones identified in the homogeneous case previously, and the
argument on their emergence are unchanged.
Assessing the impact of changing the risk aversion of banks
is shown in figure 4. Here we observe the same properties as
in the homogenous case and the results are only varying to the
extent that the incomplete non-empty networks are found. If
the mid-ranking bank has a high expected return, we observe
that it receiving interbank loans is higher and thus the proba-
bility of these network structures is increased accordingly. The
same observation we also make when analysing the effect a
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Fig. 3. Probability of equilibrium network structures for varying µ2 (λ = 2,
σr = 1.6)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
λ
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
MMM
 
 
(a) Homogeneous case µi = 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
λ
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
LMH
 
 
(b) Heterogeneous case µ2 = 1
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(d) Heterogeneous case µ2 = 0
Fig. 4. Probability of equilibrium network structures for varying λ (σr = 1.6)
change of the risk has on the observed network structures as
in figure 5.
We can thus conclude that the introduction of heterogeneity
in the banks’ expected returns does not affect the outcome
substantially and the results obtained for the homogeneous
case can be shown to be robust. We will thus focus on the
homogeneous case in the following discussion of the policy
implications.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The credit crisis 2007-08 was characterized, among other
things, by the withdrawal of interbank lending facilities of
banks. Analysis showed that the uncertainty surrounding the
solvency of other banks made banks very cautious in advanc-
ing new interbank loans or extending the maturity of existing
arrangements. We can use our model to explain these obser-
vations. If the risk of banks increases our model suggests that
the likelihood of networks that show less interbank lending or
even its absence become more likely, explaining the reduction
in interbank lending that was observed. This effect might have
been well exacerbated by an increase in the risk aversion of
banks in times their own solvency was questioned as confirmed
by our model. Hence even without a reduction in the expected
returns, due to the questionable solvency of many banks, we
should observe a reduction in interbank lending.
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(d) Heterogeneous case µ2 = 0
Fig. 5. Probability of equilibrium network structures for varying σr (λ = 2)
From our model we can also deduct the importance of the
following strategy in the emergence or absence of interbank
lending. Hence the existence of interbank lending will to a
large extend depend on expectation formation, and thus it
is important to maintain trust in the solvency of banks. A
reduction in the quality of the private signals banks have
about each other will also be detrimental to the existence of a
flourishing interbank market. Any regulator might want for this
reason seek to ensure that information on a banks’ solvency is
easily available as to reduce the risks banks expose themselves
to.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We provided a model of interbank lending where banks seek
to maximize expected utility in the presence of uncertainty
regarding the risks of a counterparty bank. Banks assess
the risk of other banks by relying on a public signal, their
individual private signal as well as extracting information
from the lending behavior of other banks. We showed that
in equilibrium four network structures of interbank lending
dominate, the empty network (no lending), the full network
(all banks lend to each other), a network in which one
bank receives interbank loans from the other banks, and a
network where two banks receive interbank loans from the
other banks. These network structures were arising mainly
from a ”following” strategy in which a bank would only lend
if the other bank would also do so, providing equilibria that
are vulnerable to small shocks that can change the equilibrium
structure easily.
The analysis of the model presented here was limited to
banking systems with only three banks. An extension to
include more banks is in principle straightforward but comes
at the cost of significantly increased computational complexity
such that additional constraints on the network structure would
have to be imposed to make it tractable. A further extension
might be that the expected returns are made endogenous to the
network structure and the exposure of the bank to interbank
loans, thus depending on the network structure itself. Using
such extensions would allow us to provide a more general
equilibrium of the interbank lending network.
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